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Why Some Muslim Countries Are
Democracies and Some Are Not

Democracy in
Muslim Countries:
A Global Analysis

Shaheen Mozaffar
he transitions to democracy in Tunisia and
Egypt shortly after the popular uprisings of
the Arab Spring, and subsequently in Libya,
provide an opportunity to test the empirical validity
of the conventional wisdom that democracy cannot
be established and sustained in Muslim countries.
This article undertakes this task through a systematic
comparative analysis of 56 countries classified as
Muslim countries by virtue of their membership in the
Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC). It first maps
variations in the incidence of democracy among the 56
Muslim countries based on the widely used Freedom
House Rating (FHR, www.freedomhouse.org) of
countries into “Free,” “Partly Free” and “Not Free.”
It then presents the results of regression analyses to
illustrate the importance of cross-national variations
in (1) religious, ethnic and linguistic diversity, and
(2) the political institutionalization of religion to
explain why some Muslim countries are democracies
and some are not.

The data displayed in Table 1 show
that the majority (57%) of Muslim
countries are either democracies or
semi-democracies, with 7% classified
as Free and 50% as Partly Free, while
43% are not democracies. Regional
comparisons reveal that 73% of Muslim
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA) and 71% of Muslim countries in
Asia are either democracies or semidemocracies. Of the three countries
classified in the Other category,
Guyana and Suriname are democracies and Albania is a semi-democracy.
And in the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA), 33% of the countries
are semi-democracies. The data also
show, however, that 67% of the Muslim
countries in MENA, 67% in Central
Asia, 27% in SSA, and 29% in Asia are
not democracies. The Chi-Square value
at the bottom of Table 1 attests to the
statistical significance of these results,
meaning that they are not random.

T

Table 2 presents the results of three
regression models to explain the
observed variations in the incidence
of democracy in Muslim countries
described above. The Social Model

Table 1 – Democracy in Muslim Countries: A Global Comparison
Freedom House Ratings

Africa

MENA

Asia

Central Asia

Other

Totals

Free

9.1%
(N = 2)

0.0%
(N = 0)

0.0%
(N = 0)

0.0%
(N = 0)

66.7%
(N = 2)

7.0%
(N = 4)

Partly Free

63.6%
(N =14)

33.3%
(N = 6)

71.4%
(N = 5)

33.3%
(N = 2)

33.3%
(N = 1)

50.0%
(N = 28)

Not Free

27.3%
(N = 6)

66.7%
(N = 12)

28.6%
(N = 2)

66.7%
(N = 4)

0.0%
(N = 0)

43.0%
(N = 24)

Totals

100.0%
(N = 22)

100.0%
(N = 18)

100.0%
(N = 7)

100.0%
(N = 6)

100.0%
(N = 3)

100.0%
(N = 56)

X 2 = 26.21 (sig. = .001)
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Table 2 – The Impact of Social Diversity and Institutionalization of Religion on Democracy in Muslim Countries
Variables

Social Model

Political Model

Additive Model

Ethnic Diversity

-.102		-.023
(.06)		(.06)

Linguistic Diversity

.167		.030
(.05)		(.05)

	 
.398**		 
.298*
Religious Diversity
(.08)		(.08)
		  -.455***	 
-.359**
Government
Regulation of Religion
		
(.162)
(.17)
		 -.083
Government
Favoritism of Religion
		
(.16)

-.098
(.17)

	   1.132***	  
2.663***	  
2.211***
Constant
(.18)
(.29)
(.40)
R2
.189
.246
.318
F	 
4.03**	  
8.63***	  
4.66***
N
56
56
56
Entries are standardized coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. All statistically significant coefficients are in bold.
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001.

examines the impact of ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity measured
by quantitative indices (Alesina et al.,
Journal of Economic Growth [2003]) that
classify countries on each indicator
of diversity on a scale from 0 (totally
homogeneous) to 1 (totally heterogeneous). The regression analysis shows,
counter-intuitively, that religious
diversity has a positive and statistically
significant impact on the incidence of
democracy in Muslim countries. Ethnic
diversity has a negative impact and linguistic diversity a positive impact, but
neither effect is statistically significant.
The Political Model examines the
impact of the institutionalization of
religion; that is, the separation or fusion
of state and religion as indicated by the
extent of (a) government regulation of
religion and (b) government favoritism
20

of one religion over another. Both
indicators are measured by quantitative
indices (Grim and Finke, Interdisciplinary
Journal of Research on Religion [2006])
that classify countries on each indicator
on a scale from 1 (low institutionalization or separation of state and religion)
to 10 (high institutionalization or
fusion of state and religion). The regression analysis shows that the higher the
fusion of state and religion the less likely
a Muslim country will be a democracy,
although the negative impact of government favoritism of one religion over
another is statistically insignificant.
However, its substantially high and
statistically significant negative coefficient (-.455) indicates that government
regulation of religion more severely
reduces the prospect for democracy in a
Muslim country.

The Additive Model examines the
combined effects of social diversity
and institutionalization of religion. It
reinforces the individual results of the
previous two models. Religious diversity facilitates, while the fusion of state
and religion hinders, the prospects for
democracy in Muslim countries.

Implications
The data in Table 1 show that the
conventional wisdom that Muslim
countries are inhospitable to democracy is f latly wrong. Not only are
most Muslim countries in the world
democracies, but the world’s largest
and second-largest Muslim countries,
Indonesia and Bangladesh, respectively, are vibrant democracies. Even in
MENA, a region widely believed to be
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the one most inhospitable to democracy, five of the six countries classified
as semi-democracies are Arab countries
(Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco,
and Yemen). The sixth, non-Arab
Turkey, is the second-largest Muslim
country in the region and has been
governed by a democratically elected
coalition of Islamist parties for the past
ten years. However, the data also confirm the fact that the democracy deficit
in the Muslim world is not a Muslim
deficit but an Arab deficit. All the
MENA countries classified as Not Free
are Arab countries, and they comprise
fully half of the Muslim countries that
are classified as Not Free.
The regression results in Table 2 help
explain why the conventional wisdom
is wrong and why some Muslim countries are democracies and some are not.
The conventional wisdom assumes a
ref lexive congruence between culture and behavior that produces the
egregiously f lawed and empirically
false view of religion as the overriding
source of politics. The Social Model,
however, suggests the salience of other
social variables such as ethnicity and
language as alternative sources of politics. It thus highlights the importance
of cross-cutting interactions between
ethnicity, language and religion in
creating multiple, contingent and
strategic sources and opportunities for
people to define their political interests
and organize their political behavior,
thereby mitigating the exaggerated
social salience and political relevance
incorrectly attributed to religion in
conventional wisdom. Herein lies
the key to the democratic success of
Muslim countries in SSA and Asia, all
of which feature high levels of ethnic
and linguistic diversity that override
religious divisions. Social diversity, in
other words, bolsters democracy.
Herein also lies a partial but crucial
explanation for the democracy deficit
of Arab and Central Asian Muslim
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countries. Arab countries are religiously
and linguistically more homogenous,
but just as ethnically diverse as Muslim
countries elsewhere in the world.
Ethnicity, in fact, has greater social
salience than religion in some Arab
countries, notably in Iraq and Libya.
Yet, the high degree of institutionalization of religion, which enables authoritarian Arab states to use religion as a
cost-effective political tool to suppress
alternative forms of interest articulation and political organization, severely
vitiates the potential of ethnicity as a
source of political mobilization. This
combination of high social salience of
religion in the context of marked ethnic
and linguistic diversity and high institutionalization of religion also accounts
for the democracy deficit of Muslim
countries in Central Asia. The fusion
of state and religion, therefore, is not
culturally determined, but a deliberate
choice of rulers and the singular source

diversity, especially religious pluralism,
on the country’s democracy.
This article underscores the need
to reject cultural explanations of
democracy that permeate the conventional wisdom about the relationship
between democracy and Islam. Such
explanations are not only ideologically noxious, they grossly misconstrue
the nature, origin and development
of democracy in the modern world.
The article stresses instead the importance of examining the relationship
between democracy and Islam through
a conceptually sound, theoretically
informed and empirically grounded
analysis. Such an analysis clarifies
how cross-national variations in social
diversity and the institutionalization of
religion, separately and jointly, establish a context in which people make
rational political choices about the sorts
of democracy they want.

Religious diversity facilitates,
while the fusion of state and
religion hinders, the prospects for
democracy in Muslim countries.
of dictatorship and associated democracy deficit in Muslim countries in
MENA and Central Asia.
By contrast, the low social salience of
religion associated with the moderating
effects of ethnic and language diversity
and low political institutionalization
not only encourage religious pluralism,
but also help to facilitate democracy
in Muslim countries in SSA and Asia.
Moreover, even when a country such
as Indonesia imposes some restrictions
on religion, as it did in 2009 to counter
the threat of Al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism, they were insufficient to offset
the positive effects of entrenched social
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